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Abstract
A striking limitation of human cognition is our inability to ex-
ecute some tasks simultaneously. Recent work suggests that
such limitations can arise from a fundamental tradeoff in net-
work architectures that is driven by the sharing of represen-
tations between tasks: sharing promotes quicker learning, at
the expense of interference while multitasking. From this per-
spective, multitasking failures might reflect a preference for
learning efficiency over multitasking capability. We explore
this hypothesis by formulating an ideal Bayesian agent that
maximizes expected reward by learning either shared or sep-
arate representations for a task set. We investigate the agent’s
behavior and show that over a large space of parameters the
agent sacrifices long-run optimality (higher multitasking ca-
pacity) for short-term reward (faster learning). Furthermore,
we construct a general mathematical framework in which ratio-
nal choices between learning speed and processing efficiency
can be examined for a variety of different task environments.
Keywords: multitasking; cognitive control; Bayesian infer-
ence; capacity constraints;
Introduction
The human brain’s ability to simultaneously perform distinct
tasks contains a curious tension. On one hand, we are able to
concurrently carry out a large number of actions (e.g. breathe,
speak, chew gum, etc.) seemingly without exerting any effort.
In contrast, some behaviors defy parallel execution (e.g. solv-
ing calculus problems and constructing shopping lists) and
require serialization to successfully execute.
The distinction between sets of tasks that can be executed
concurrently and those that cannot is often referred to in terms
of a fundamental distinction between controlled and auto-
matic processing (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schnei-
der, 1977). Early theories attributed the inability to carry out
multiple control-demanding tasks in parallel to reliance on
a single, limited-capacity, serial processing mechanism – a
hypothesis that has continued to dominate major theories of
cognition (e.g., Anderson, 2013). The “multiple-resource hy-
pothesis” presents a challenge to this view, arguing that mul-
titasking limitations may reflect competition for the use of
local resources (e.g., shared task-specific representations) by
sets of tasks, rather than common reliance on a central con-
trol mechanism (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972; Feng,
Schwemmer, Gershman, & Cohen, 2014; Navon & Gopher,
1979; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Musslick et al., 2016; Salvucci
& Taatgen, 2008; Wickens, 1991). Under this view, the role
of cognitive control is to resolve such conflicts when they
arise by limiting processing to only a single task at a time
(Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Botvinick, Braver,
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). That is, limiting processing is
the purpose of control, rather than a reflection of a constraint
on the control system itself. Recent computational work has
provided a formal grounding for this argument, showing that
even modest amounts of overlap between task representations
can drastically limit the number of tasks a network can engage
at the same time without invoking interference among them
(Feng et al., 2014; Musslick et al., 2016; Petri et al., 2020).
Critically, this number appears to be relatively insensitive to
the size of the network.
The findings above raise an important question: insofar
as shared representation between tasks impose limitations on
multitasking, why would a neural system prefer shared rep-
resentations over separate ones? Insights into this question
can be gained from the machine learning literature, where
the learning of shared representations between tasks is con-
sidered a desirable outcome (Baxter, 1995; Caruana, 1998;
Bengio, Courville, & Vincent, 2013). For instance, work on
multi-task learning1 suggests that shared representations be-
tween tasks promote faster learning, as well as better general-
ization performance across tasks (Caruana, 1997; Collobert
& Weston, 2008). Moreover, learning dynamics in neural
networks themselves promote the learning of shared repre-
sentation based on shared structure in the task environment
(Hinton, 1986; Saxe, McClelland, & Ganguli, 2013; Mus-
slick et al., 2017). Thus, there appears to be a fundamental
tradeoff in neural networks between the efficiency of learn-
ing (and generalization) on the one hand, and the efficiency
of processing (i.e., multitasking capability) on the other hand
(Musslick et al., 2017).
The tradeoff between learning and processing efficiency
constitutes an optimization problem that is dependent on the
demands of the task environment. The work described here
examines this optimization problem as a function of critical
parameters, such as the differences in rate of learning for
shared vs. separated representations, and the benefits gained
by parallel over serial task performance. Analysis of this
problem may help provide a formally rigorous, and even nor-
mative account of longstanding, well-characterized psycho-
logical phenomena, such as the common trajectory in skill
acquisition from controlled to automatic processing (Shiffrin
& Schneider, 1977; Logan, 1980).
Ideally, our analysis would build on formal characteriza-
tion of the learning rate for different types of representations,
given a specified learning algorithm (e.g. backpropagation).
However, since this is not immediately available, to con-
struct a probabilistic generative model we begin by assuming
1Note that the term ’multi-task’ differs from the term ’multitask-
ing’. The former refers to the paradigm of training the same network
on multiple tasks, whereas the latter refers to the process of carrying
out multiple tasks concurrently.
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simple functional forms for the learning trajectory associated
with shared vs. separated task representations in a multitask-
ing environment, and then use the generative model to define
an ideal Bayesian agent that behaves optimally inside that en-
vironment. Taken together, the environment and agent mod-
els provide a simple, normative framework in which ques-
tions about the learning-processing tradeoff can be explored.
A rational model of multitasking
We begin our analysis of the optimal balance between learn-
ing and processing efficiency by formalizing the task envi-
ronment. We then describe how the agent model chooses be-
tween the use of shared vs. separate representations in that
environment to optimize performance, which we define as
maximizing reward over the entire horizon of performance.
Task Environment
We consider an environment in which a task can be defined
as a process (e.g. naming the color of a stimulus) that maps
the dimension of a stimulus (e.g. color) to a particular re-
sponse dimension (e.g. verbal response). Here we assume
that stimuli consist of N dimensions (e.g. color, shape, and
texture) and that responses are carried out over K response
dimensions (e.g. naming, pointing, or looking), resulting in
NK possible tasks in any environment. We adopt a formal
definition of multitasking from earlier work (Musslick et al.,
2016; Alon et al., 2017; Lesnick, Musslick, Dey, & Cohen,
2020), in which a multitasking condition is defined as the re-
quirement to execute multiple tasks at the same time, none of
which share a stimulus or response dimension. Consequently,
at most min{N,K} tasks can be carried out concurrently.
The agent is asked to optimize performance over a series
of τ multitasking trials. On each trial, the agent is asked to
perform α tasks, where α is drawn from a latent multinomial
distribution. We introduce multitasking pressure by specify-
ing a reward schedule that favors concurrent performance of
tasks. For every task answered correctly, the agent receives
1 unit of reward, resulting in α rewards if the agent is able
to perform all tasks with maximal accuracy at the same time.
However, if the agent chooses instead to perform all tasks
sequentially, it loses jC reward units on task j, where j in-
dexes the tasks from 0 to α− 1 (so that the agent receives
∑α−1j=0 1− jC rewards given maximal accuracy). C is termed
the “serialization cost” or “time cost”. We note that this re-
ward schedule is chosen largely for analytical convenience,
and is not itself based on a particular normative principle or
property of the environment. One alternative could be to set a
penalty for serialized execution based on the opportunity cost
per time-step. We will extend our results to arbitrary reward
schedules in a later section.
Optimization is defined as the choice, on each trial, of
a performance strategy that maximizes total future reward;
that is, summed over the current trial and the potentially dis-
counted reward anticipated for each future trial. This requires
estimating and convolving the expected multitasking require-
ments over trials, performance for executing the tasks concur-
rently vs. individually as a function of the estimated learning
rate for each (see below), and the serialization costs associ-
ated with performing tasks sequentially.
Agent
The agent is considered to be a rational decision-maker
that chooses between two independent, trainable processing
strategies that result from two extremes of how multiple tasks
can be represented in a single network (see Figure 1). The
first representation strategy is as a minimal basis set, in which
all tasks relying on the same stimulus dimension encode the
stimuli using the same (shared) set of hidden representations
(i.e. N sets of hidden representations) that are then mapped to
the output dimensions for each of the tasks. The second strat-
egy uses tensor product representations, in which each task
encodes its stimuli using its own set of (separated) hidden rep-
resentations (resulting in NK sets of hidden representations)
that are mapped to the output dimension for the task. While
the minimal basis set provides a more efficient encoding of
the stimuli, it does not permit multitasking since the use of
shared representations introduces crosstalk between any pair
of simultaneously activated tasks (Feng et al., 2014; Musslick
et al., 2016; Alon et al., 2017). Thus, use of the minimal ba-
sis set forces a serialization cost of jC reward units for task
j = 1,2, . . . ,α− 1. Conversely, the tensor product represen-
tation permits multitasking without interference, since each
task is assigned its own set of hidden representations that
comprise independent processing pathways in the network.
We assume that the agent has the potential to develop both
forms of representation, but these must be learned.
Figure 1: Schematic of network schemes that maximize rep-
resentation overlap (a) vs. multitasking capability (b). C, S,
T designate the stimulus dimensions (”color”, ”shape”, and
”texture”), while W, K, P designate the response dimensions
(”word”, ”keyboard”, ”point”). The hidden-layer representa-
tion of the stimulus in (a) is shared for all three tasks involving
the same input dimension (minimal basis set representation),
whereas in (b) a separate hidden-layer representation is dedi-
cated to each task (tensor product representation).
Previous work has shown that, for a set of tasks that are in
principle multitaskable, training using shared representations
(such as a minimal basis set) leads to faster acquisition than
learning separate representations for each task (such as a ten-
sor product), as the former enables the sharing of learning sig-
nals across tasks (Musslick et al., 2017). We implement these
effects by assuming that 1) the agent learns these two types
of representations (i.e. processing strategies) by selecting and
executing one or the other on each trial; 2) performance for
each strategy improves as a function of the number of trials
selected, and 3) learning is faster for the minimal basis set
strategy than for the tensor product strategy, as described be-
low.
To model the learning of tasks, we define a probability of
success function (aka “training function”) for each of the two
processing strategies. Let fB, fT : N≥0 → [0,1] denote these
training functions for the minimal basis set and tensor product
strategies, respectively. These serve as explicit characteriza-
tions of the agent’s learning dynamics; fX (t) implements the
learning curve by evaluating the probability of success on a
given task after representation X has been selected t times.
That is, every time the agent chooses to process the tasks in
the trial using strategy X , the success probability for the task
under strategy X increases for the next time-step. More for-
mally, let x1,x2, . . . ,xt−1 be a sequence of t−1 choices of rep-
resentation. We define the probability that an agent succeeds
when employing strategy X on a task on trial t as:
PX (success on a task in trial t) = fX (
t−1
∑
i=1
1xi=X ) (1)
For convenience, we use the logistic function fX (t| k, t0) =
1
1+e−k(t−t0)
. However, our analysis applies to any learning
function that is monotonically increasing and is bounded
0 ≤ fX (t) ≤ 1, for all t. As noted above, we assume that
learning occurs at a faster rate for the minimal basis set strat-
egy as compared to tensor product strategy, and examine the
influence of this difference by exploring a range of values for
k, t0 that together determine the rate of learning.
The agent uses standard Bayesian machinery to infer the
expected reward under each representation, and then selects
the representation that maximizes total discounted future re-
ward. Specifically, let EX [R] denote the expected reward for
strategy X , EX [R|t] denote the expected reward on trial t, and
µ(t) be the temporal discounting function. Then we have that
EX [R] = ∑τt=0 µ(t)EX [R|t]. Though temporal discounting can
be irrational in many contexts, we note that a fully rational
agent can be achieved with µ(t) = 1.
Recall that α is the randomly assigned number of tasks re-
quired to be performed on a given trial. By marginalizing
over α, we get that the expected reward on each individual
trial is EX [R|t] = ∑min{N,K}i=1 P(α= i)EX [R|t,α= i]. Thus, the
expected rewards for the minimal basis set and tensor product
strategies correspond to
EB[R|t] =
min{N,K}
∑
i=1
P(α= i)
i−1
∑
j=0
PB(success|t)(1− jC)
ET [R|t] =
min{N,K}
∑
i=1
P(α= i)
i−1
∑
j=0
PT (success|t)(1)
(2)
In order to compute the expected reward terms in Equa-
tion (2), the agent must be able to evaluate P(α = i) and
PX (success|t) by inferring the multinomial task distribution,
as well as the parameters of each training function fX . The
first can be inferred using Bayes’ theorem, by keeping track
of the number of times each particular α value was seen, in
conjunction with a Dirichlet prior (we start from a uniform
prior, implying absence of strong a priori belief about the
distribution).
Inferring the parameters for the two training functions
fB, fT can similarly be done by tracking the history of suc-
cesses and failures and then performing a Bayesian logistic
regression (intuitively, this can be understood as the agent in-
ferring how fast it will learn). In this model, k and t0 have
independent normal priors centered on their true values with
high variance. Finally, we assume that the agent already
knows τ, the sequential processing cost C, and the tempo-
ral discounting function µ(t).
Once the expected values are computed, the agent must
select an action. We assume this is done using a standard
explore-exploit algorithm, the ε-greedy rule, in which the
agent picks the action associated with greatest value with
probability 1− ε, and uniformly otherwise.
Formal analysis of equilibrium
We begin by analyzing an agent that has perfect knowledge
about the task environment and learning rate, in order to as-
sess performance independently of noise that might be gener-
ated by an inference process over these factors. This allows us
to analytically derive equilibrium conditions under which the
agent should be indifferent between the minimal basis set and
the tensor product strategies. For this section, we let N < K
so that N = min{N,K} without loss of generality.
Observe that the expressions in Equation (2) reduce to:
EB[R|t] = fB(t)E[g(α,C)]
ET [R|t] = fT (t)E[α]
(3)
where g(i,C) = ∑i−1j=0(1− jC). Note that g(i,C) encodes the
amount of reward accrued by the agent for completing i tasks
in a serial fashion with time cost C. Plugging Equation (3)
into the expression for the expected reward of both strategies
we can express the condition for which the agent should be
indifferent between them:
E[α]
E[g(α,C)]
=
∑τt=0 µ(t) fB(t)
∑τt=0 µ(t) fT (t)
(4)
An interesting property of this result is that agent-related
and environmental parameters are analytically separable. Ob-
serve that the expectation terms on the left correspond to
the agent’s expected reward at asymptotic performance lev-
els, and that the sum terms on the right denote the number
of expected successes in a critical time period specified by
the conjunction of the temporal discounting function and the
training function. The indifference point can be understood
intuitively as a surface over which the ratio of expected even-
tual rewards is equal to the ratio of times at which they are
likely to be accrued (discounted by time). That is, the left side
contains the ratio of the rewards the agent expects to earn if it
is always correct, whereas the right side is a ratio of functions
that weight when the agent prefers to receive the rewards.
Recall that E[g(α,C)] corresponds to E[∑α−1j=0 (1− jC)] =
E
[
α
2
(
1+ [1− (α− 1)C]
)]
. Since C is a constant, it can be
isolated from the expectation in Equation (4) to get an expres-
sion for the precise value of the serialization cost that charac-
terizes the indifference surface. That is:
Ceq =
2E[α]
(
1− ∑τt=0 µ(t) fT (t)∑τt=0 µ(t) fB(t)
)
E[α(α−1)] (5)
Equation (5) provides a rigorous characterization of the
tradeoff between basis set and tensor product learning in mul-
titasking environments described in the Introduction:
1. As the average number of parallel tasks increases, the cost
of serialization must vanish for minimal basis set represen-
tations to remain preferable: E[α]→ ∞ =⇒ Ceq→ 0.
2. As the learning benefit of shared representations dimin-
ishes, the value of shared representations disappears. That
is, as the ratio between the (discounted) tensor product and
basis set training functions approaches unity, for the lat-
ter to remain preferable the cost of serialization must tend
toward zero: ∑
τ
t=0 µ(t) fT (t)
∑τt=0 µ(t) fB(t)
→ 1 =⇒ Ceq→ 0.
3. ∑
τ
t=0 µ(t) fT (t)
∑τt=0 µ(t) fB(t)
→ 0 =⇒ Ceq → 2E[α]E[α(α−1)] : As the ratio of
the discounted training functions for the tensor product
and minimal basis set representations approaches 0, the
equilibrium-defining serialization cost becomes a function
of the number of tasks required to be performed. Partic-
ularly, Ceq is the serialization cost that sets expected re-
ward for the minimal basis set representation to 0. This
implication is not immediately obvious. Consider the task
distribution P[α = 1] = P[α = 2] = 1/2. In this environ-
ment, Ceq = 3 and at asymptotic performance levels, the
agent expects to win 1 reward unit when α= 1, or win −1
when α = 2. This makes sense; if learning tensor prod-
uct representations is so much slower than minimal basis
set representations that the ratio of the sums goes to 0, the
agent is indifferent only if the expected earnings are 0.
Finally, we note that we have used arbitrary reward func-
tions for the analyses above. However, it is possible to gen-
eralize the equilibrium condition in Equation (4) to any sta-
tionary reward function (i.e. does not change over the course
of the experiment). Let gB( j,θB) denote any reward func-
tion applied independently to each task, with arbitrary depen-
dence on the task’s index j and other fixed parameters θB.
Furthermore, let GB(i,θB) = ∑i−1j=0 gB( j,θB) be the accumu-
lated reward across a task set consisting of i tasks. Note that
previous analysis corresponds to the case gB( j,θB) = 1− jC.
Specifically, gB and GB are the per-task and cumulative re-
ward functions when the agent executes tasks serially. Fi-
nally, define gT ,GT analogously for the case where the tasks
are being processed concurrently. Then a generalized equi-
librium condition is:
E[GT (α,C)]
E[GB(α,C)]
=
∑τt=0 µ(t) fB(t)
∑τt=0 µ(t) fT (t)
(6)
Observe that for gB = 1− jC and gT = 1, this reduces to
the expression in Equation (4). The existence of this gener-
alized equilibrium condition allows a large set of questions
to be phrased within this framework. For example, it is easy
to include an explicit cost of cognitive control (e.g., Shenhav,
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013; Shenhav et al., 2017; Manohar
et al., 2015) by adding a term to the basis set reward func-
tion that implements a cost that increases with the number
of tasks executed, or the use of a per-task penalty consisting
of the asymptotic-performance opportunity cost (a function
exclusively of α).
Numerical analysis with parameter inference
The analysis above characterized the behavior of an agent
with perfect knowledge of the task environment and its learn-
ing functions. Here we relax these assumptions, and use nu-
merical simulations2 to evaluate the behavior of an agent that
must infer these parameters. We assess the agent’s perfor-
mance across a series of task environments and learning spec-
ifications by crossing a set of reasonable parameter ranges.
We let τ = 1000. We set C ∈ [0,1], varying from no pun-
ishment to receiving no reward for a correct answer. We
use an exponential discounting scheme µ(t) = γ−0.025t for
γ∈ [0.5,1.0]. This covers the range from extreme discounting
to no discounting at all. We characterize the training func-
tions as logistic with fX (t) = 11+e−0.1(t−tX ) . This allows us to
precisely characterize difference in learning rates through the
ratio tT/tB. To that end, we set tB = 200, reflecting the speed
of minimal basis set learning, and let tT vary in [200,600].
We let N = K = 4 and define the distribution over tasks as
P(α= 1) = 0.7, P(α= 2) = P(α= 3) = P(α= 4) = 0.1 so
that the intensity and frequency of multitasking trials is suf-
ficient to permit either strategy given appropriate parameters.
We set ε = 0.1 to facilitate early exploration of the tensor
product option in the face of immediate rewards due to the
minimal basis set option. Finally, we quantify the agent’s
strategy preference as P(pick X) = number of times X was pickedτ ,
and track how P(pick basis set) varies with the parameters3.
The results (see Fig. 2) show that there is a broad range
of parameters under which the agent will opt for select-
ing the minimal basis set strategy over the tensor product
2code available at https://github.com/yotamSagiv/thesis
3We can use Equation (5) to show that even with weak discount-
ing (γ= 0.90) and a modest learning rate ratio tT /tB = 2, the impor-
tance of fast training is such that the time cost must nearly equal the
reward value (Ceq ≈ 0.75) for indifference in this environment.
Figure 2: Simulation results for the inference model. tT/tB
refers to the midpoint ratio of the tensor product and minimal
basis set training functions. Time cost denotes the value of C.
Note that the agent increases their preference for the minimal
basis set representation when the time cost is decreased, the
learning rate ratio is increased, or gamma is decreased.
strategy (P(pick basis set) > 0.5). These preferences align
with the normative analysis of how the parameters should
affect overall preference: preference for the minimal basis
set strategy increases with relative speed of learning, de-
creases with serialization cost, and increases with the strength
of temporal discounting as indicated by the linear model
fit P(select basis set) ∼ b1 × tTtB + b2 × timeCost + b3 × γ
(b1 = 0.25, t(78) = 47.26, p < 0.001; b2 = −0.52, t(78) =
−49.38, p < 0.001; b3 =−0.64, t(78) =−35.78, p < 0.001).
Discussion
The constraints on human multitasking abilities present an in-
teresting puzzle given the enormous processing capability of
the brain. Here, we explored the hypothesis that this reflects
a fundamental tradeoff between learning and processing effi-
ciency (Musslick et al., 2017), in which preference for learn-
ing to perform a set of tasks faster, which relies on the use of
shared representations (Caruana, 1998; Baxter, 1995), comes
at the expense of multitasking efficiency (Allport et al., 1972;
Feng et al., 2014; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Meyer & Kieras,
1997; Musslick et al., 2016; Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008; Wick-
ens, 1991). This tradeoff between the value of shared vs. sep-
arated representations is reminiscent of the complementary
learning systems hypothesis (McClelland, McNaughton, &
O’Reilly, 1995), which proposes the existence of two inde-
pendent learning mechanisms. The first relies on shared rep-
resentations to support inference, and the second uses sep-
arate representations to avoid the cost of catastrophic inter-
ference for memory encoding and retrieval. Thus, the trade-
off between shared and separated representations appears to
a fundamental one, that has different consequences in differ-
ent processing contexts. Here, we have provided a normative
analysis of this tradeoff in the context of task performance
that, under various assumptions, defines the conditions under
which limitations in multitasking ability can be viewed as a
result of optimal decision-making.
Agent behavior in our model was governed by several fac-
tors: the distribution of multitasking opportunities within the
environment, the cost of serial vs. parallel performance, the
rate at which each strategy is learned, and the discount rate for
future rewards. The broad range of these factors over which
the minimal basis set strategy was optimal suggests that the
theory provides a plausible account of why so many skills
(e.g. driving a car, playing an instrument) seem to rely on
cognitive control and serial execution during acquisition.
Theories of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1982;
Gigerenzer, 2008) assume that suboptimalities in human be-
havior arise from the use of heuristics rather than full deliber-
ation, given the bounds of limited multitasking capacity and
limited available information. Research in artificial intelli-
gence has suggested that such behavior is normative; that is,
it may reflect bounded optimality, in which an agent maxi-
mizes reward per unit time given intrinsic limitations in its
computational architecture (Russell & Subramanian, 1995).
The principles of bounded optimality are reflected in psycho-
logical models of cognition, in which humans perform opti-
mally within the constraints of the cognitive system (Griffiths,
Lieder, & Goodman, 2015; Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenen-
baum, 2015). Yet, these accounts do not explain why com-
putational limitations exist in the first place, other than the
assumption of limited processing power/speed. The work
here suggests that the bounds may arise from a normative re-
sponse to constraints imposed by tradeoffs intrinsic to any
network architecture, whether neural or artificial – specifi-
cally, the tradeoff between the advantages of faster learning
and generalization provided by shared representations, and
the advantages of concurrent parallelism and processing effi-
ciency provided by separated representations (Musslick et al.,
2017). Under this framework the source of the limitation is
not in the brain/computing device, but rather in the fact that
time in life is finite (i.e., the benefits of learning a task quickly
far outweigh the value of learning it “optimally”).
Of course, the model we described is relatively simple, and
can be extended in a number of ways. Rather than using a
logistic function to characterize learning, it may be more rea-
sonable to scale the benefit of shared representations by the
number of tasks (e.g. as in Musslick et al., 2017), or to im-
plement the learning dynamics of actual neural networks on
similar task spaces. Additionally, a cost of control parameter
could be incorporated that scales with the number of tasks
being executed and/or the complexity of the task environ-
ment (Shenhav et al., 2013). It is also plausible to consider
the transfer of learning between the two strategies (i.e. gen-
eralization). This may be an important factor in shaping how
representations evolve from the minimal basis set to tensor
product forms over the course of training, as suggested by
some neural evidence (Garner & Dux, 2015).
One might also consider meta-learning. The simulated
agents learned about their task environment and learning
functions, but always began with the same predetermined,
static priors. It is possible that repeated experience over dif-
ferent task domains could inform these priors, improving the
initial estimates of the learning functions. This would in-
duce a higher rate of convergence to the optimal decision for
cases in which the agent’s prior experiences are relevant, and
might also explain any reluctance to switch away from sub-
optimal decision-making in contexts where its experience is
misleading. Such effects could be informative to similar lines
of inquiry regarding separate mechanisms for goal-directed
and habitual responding in mammals undergoing instrumen-
tal conditioning (Yin & Knowlton, 2006).
In sum, the results presented here strongly support the pro-
posal that constraints in multitasking observed in human per-
formance may arise from a normative approach to an in-
escapable tradeoff between the value of rapidly acquiring a
set of novel skills, and optimizing the efficiency with which
these skills can be exercised. Such a normative theory of
multitasking may have value not only for understanding hu-
man performance, but also for the design of artificial systems.
Having a formal language with which to consider the tradeoff
between learning efficiency and multitasking capability (and
the closely related constructs of controlled vs. automatic pro-
cessing) will facilitate precise analysis of the design of au-
tonomous agents that are capable not only of guiding their
own actions, but also of learning the best ways of doing so.
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